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PROFESSOR ED COOPER: ZEN MINIMALIST
Linda S. Mullenix*
Professor Ed Cooper is a great listener. As a matter of fact, Pro-
fessor Ed Cooper is a prodigious listener. And he has buns of steel.
In celebration of his twentieth year as the Reporter for the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules, I write to contribute some modest
reflections on Professor Cooper's tenure as Advisory Committee
Reporter. My comments are those of an academic who had the op-
portunity to observe the Advisory Committee for nearly a decade,
but they are largely the comments of an outsider. Readers might be
disappointed to find that there is no dish or inside baseball here.
Although I knew Professor Cooper as a colleague and friend
before his appointment as the Advisory Committee Reporter, my
fine appreciation for Professor Cooper was forged during his early
years as Reporter. Assuming the role of Reporter in 1991, Professor
Cooper was immediately thrust into the midst of the great Rule 23
mass-tort and class-action controversy then swirling in the federal
courts. But more on this later.
To fully appreciate Professor Cooper's role in the class-action
wars-and my entirely minor, obscure, and bit part in that procedu-
ral melodrama-requires a somewhat self-absorbed, digressive
background narrative. This narrative sets the stage for the intersec-
tion of the Advisory Committee, Rule 23 revision, Professor Cooper,
and me.
I was first exposed to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from
1989-1990, when I worked at the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) Re-
search Division as a Supreme Court Judicial Fellow. During that
year, Fifth Circuit Judge John C. Godbold headed the FJC, and he
was succeeded by Judge William W. Schwartzer of the Northern Dis-
trict of California. As part of this appointment, I had the opportu-
nity to attend all meetings of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
and the meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
For a procedure junkie, this was a heady experience that only other
procedure junkies can possibly understand. Otherwise, it garners
no admiration points with one's children (quite the contrary).
* Morris and Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, The University of Texas School of Law. Our
instruction was to contribute a reflection on Professor Cooper, approximately ten pages, and
without footnotes. I have assiduously followed these directions.
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My year at the FJC coincided with an auspicious paradigm shift in
the operation of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. Congres-
sional enactment ofjudicial-reform legislation in 1988 imposed new
sunshine requirements on the Federal Rules Committees. No
longer could the Rules Committees function in relative privacy, ob-
scurity, and authoritarian decisiveness. The days of rulemaking in
proverbial smoke-filled back rooms-accomplished by wise, old,
white-male sages-were over. Participatory democracy, replete with
open meetings, had been thrust upon the rulemaking process.
Somewhat vaguely aware of past history, I was present at the very
first open meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. I im-
mediately sensed the tectonic shift in atmosphere among Advisory
Committee members, including Committee Chair Judge John F.
Grady of the Northern District of Illinois and Professor Paul Car-
rington, the Advisory Committee Reporter. So taken was I with the
apparent angst among Advisory Committee members that I did the
only thing academic law professors know how to do: I wrote a law
review article.
In that masterpiece of academic erudition, I commented on the
alarming change in the Advisory Committee process, and (now) fa-
mously compared the Advisory Committee to the doomed ancien
rigime in France. I think this is the only thing I have ever written
that anyone remembers. Professor Carrington-a populist and lib-
ertarian to the core-was not amused. He was pained and, to this
day, reminds me of this comparison every time I see him.
The late 1980s and early 1990s were exhilarating times to be ex-
posed to the internal workings of the Advisory Committee, because
this period dovetailed with the immense problems generated by
mass-tort litigation in federal and state courts and the quest to find
some means for resolving these massive cases. By the mid-1980s,
every institutional law-reform group-including the American Bar
Association, the American Law Institute, the Federal Judicial
Center, the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, and the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws-was studying the dilemmas posed by mass-
tort litigation.
In the early 1990s, a series of actors converged in the judicial
arena with an interest in finding the ultimate solution to resolving
mass-tort litigation. These included Judge William Schwartzer, who
became Director of the FJC in 1990; Judge John Grady, who then
headed the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules; Professor Arthur
Miller, immediate past Reporter for the Advisory Committee who
repeatedly reminded everyone that he was present at the creation
of the 1966 Rule 23 amendments; and Professor Paul Carrington,
[VOL. 46:2
Ed Cooper: Zen Minimalist
eminent academic proceduralist. If memory serves me correctly,
Advisory Committee members also included Judge Sam Pointer of
Alabama and Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham, both of
whom took an especial interest in finding a solution to the mass-tort
litigation clogging their dockets.
By the end of the 1980s, the American Law Institute (ALI) em-
barked on its effort to grapple with the burgeoning mass-tort litiga-
tion crisis. This enterprise, called the "Complex Litigation Project,"
was shepherded by its Reporter, Professor Arthur Miller, and
Associate Reporter, Professor Mary Kay Kane. The ALI believed,
however, that any proposed amendments to the Federal Rules were
not properly within its ambit and instead focused on proposals to
amend the multidistrict-litigation statute and choice-of-law
considerations.
Several other events in the late 1980s and early 1990s converged
to provide hydraulic heft to the rule-reform movement. For
example, in spring 1990, Judge Schwartzer convened a major FJC
conference to find a comprehensive solution to the national asbes-
tos crisis, which brought together all the actors in the litigation,
including federal judges managing substantial asbestos dockets.
Rather than achieving consensus and agreement, these meetings in-
stead, ironically, moved the parties further apart and entrenched
their relative positions.
In response to the failure of the FJC asbestos conference, several
federal judges, alarmed at the intransigence of the negotiating par-
ties, took the unprecedented and dramatic step in summer 1990 of
sua sponte certifying a nationwide asbestos class action. Within ten
days, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck
down the class certification, dramatically characterizing the rogue
judges' conduct as an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial
authority.
Against this backdrop of crisis and seeming judicial embarrass-
ment, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed a panel in autumn 1990
chaired by Fifth Circuit Judge Thomas Reavley. The Reavley Com-
mission was asked to study the mass-tort-litigation problem and
issue recommendations. In early spring 1991, the Reavley Commis-
sion issued its report, suggesting that Congress legislatively resolve
the mass-tort crisis. Virtually everyone involved immediately under-
stood that this would not occur.
Thus, by late spring 1991-with the Rule 23 amendment off the
ALI's reform table, the failure of the FJC to craft a mass-tort solu-
tion to the asbestos crisis, and the ineffectual recommendations of
the Reavley Commission-the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
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placed reconsideration of the class-action rule on its agenda. The
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, with its vast institutional mem-
ory and collective class-action expertise, would now handle crafting
a solution to the mass-tort-litigation crisis.
Thus, at this crucial juncture, finally entered Professor Ed Cooper.
In the early 1990s, the stewardship of the Advisory Committee
experienced two significant changes: the appointment of Fifth Cir-
cuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham as Committee Chair and the ap-
pointment of Professor Cooper as Reporter to succeed Professor
Paul Carrington. Both changes heralded subtle shifts in interest
and temperament.
Judge Higginbotham hailed from the judicial circuit perhaps
most entrenched in the asbestos litigation crisis. By the time of his
appointment, Judge Higginbotham was more knowledgeable about
and familiar with the problems of mass-tort litigation than almost
any other jurist in the United States. Moreover, he was aggressively
committed to finding a workable solution through amending the
class action rule. Counterbalancing Judge Higginbotham's deter-
mined persona and agenda, Professor Ed Cooper embodied a stud-
ied, quiet addition to the Committee.
I can now weave together several narrative threads. With Rule 23
on the Advisory Committee's agenda, various groups had height-
ened interest as litigation stakeholders in the revision of the class-
action rule. And, consistent with the new sunshine era, everyone
invested in Rule 23 wanted to be heard during the Advisory
Committee's deliberations and amendment process. At approxi-
mately the same time that Professor Cooper arrived as the new
Committee Reporter, the American Bar Association appointed me
as Reporter for a task force on the class-action rule. In this capacity,
I spent the next five years attending Advisory Committee meetings
as various proposed Rule 23 amendments made their way through
the rulemaking process.
From 1991 through 1996, I was a backbench observer-along
with a very sizeable contingent of other backbench observers-of
assorted Rule 23 proposals and their ultimate fate. During this pe-
riod, I not only learned a good deal about the rulemaking process
but also gained great insight into the immense patience and crafts-
manship of the Committee's new Reporter, Professor Ed Cooper.
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The development of the Rule 23 amendments occurred during
three separate intervals. The first began in 1991 and extended
through 1996, culminating in the promulgation of Rule 23(f) in
1997. By then, Fourth CircuitJudge Paul Niemeyer had succeeded
Judge Higginbotham as Chair of the Advisory Committee. Perhaps
because of, or in addition to, the considerable heat that had been
generated in round one of Rule 23 revisions, Judge Niemeyer's en-
thusiasm and passion for further amending Rule 23 had waned con-
siderably by 1996.
Thus in his early days as new Committee Chair, Judge Niemeyer
deftly deflected any further Rule 23 adventures, pending some pos-
sible guidance from the Supreme Court in the then-pending ap-
peals in Amchem v. Windsor and Ortiz v. Fibreboard. With the prospect
of Supreme Court direction as a compelling rationale, Judge
Niemeyer memorably indicated that any further Rule 23 amend-
ments would be relegated "to the back burner" of the Committee's
agenda. From 1997 through the early 2000s, Rule 23 revision thus
went into quasi hibernation, asleep but never quite forgotten. The
prospect of further amending Rule 23 was then resuscitated, result-
ing in the promulgation of Rule 23(g) and (h), which became ef-
fective in 2003.
Almost all of my observations concerning Professor Cooper's role
as Reporter on the Rule 23 revisions derive from the first round of
proposed amendments, from 1991 through 1997. What I do not
and cannot know is the origin of the first proposed Rule 23 draft
amendments, which I well remember. Whatever the source, the Ad-
visory Committee's original approach from 1991-1992 was to scrap
the existing Rule 23 and create an almost entirely new class-action
rule. There was precedent for this radical root-and-branch ap-
proach in the 1996 amendments to Rule 23.
This was one of Professor Cooper's first endeavors as Committee
Reporter. He submitted his radical revision of Rule 23 to the Com-
mittee, which proposal was then disclosed to the substantial array of
sunshine overseers. No sooner had Professor Cooper's radical new
Rule 23 draft appeared that it immediately was subjected to excori-
ating, negative, and in some quarters, horrifying reaction and criti-
cism. This could not have been fun for Professor Cooper, but it did
provide a teachable moment.
WINTrER 2013]
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I began my comments by saying that Professor Cooper is a great
listener, and this was amply illustrated during the ensuing six years
of Rule 23 amendments. Over these years-and here I radically
truncate the narrative arc-Professor Cooper patiently generated
draft after draft of proposed Rule 23 revisions in response to the
barrage of comments and criticisms that the Advisory Committee
received. With every draft, he was confronted with vociferous com-
peting objections to additions, deletions, phraseology, linguistics,
and grammar. And at every twist and turn, Professor Cooper had to
assess inevitable arguments concerning Rules Enabling Act
violations.
The history of the Rule 23 draft amendments between 1991 and
1997 provides a riveting chronicle of the rulemaking process, the
positive and negative effects of open rulemaking, and the good and
bad ideas left on the cutting-room floor. Through successive drafts,
the Committee jettisoned any revision of Rule 23(a), substantial
portions of Rule 23(b), and ultimately most of the rest of the rule.
Class-action litigators, interest groups, judges, academics, and other
observers understood very well the substantive impact of various
proposals, and so the Advisory Committee was subjected to consid-
erable flak on all sides.
The most memorable fights in the later stages of the Rule 23
amendment process focused on three proposed additions to Rule
23(b). One proposal would have added a "maturity" factor for
judges to consider in certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class, to supple-
ment the existing four factors in Rule 23(b) (3) (A)-(D). This pro-
posal derived from an understanding of how mass torts evolve over
time from immature to truly mature mass-tort litigation.
Experience had suggested that hasty certification of immature
mass torts provided plaintiffs with an unfair settlement advantage
and that some immature mass-tort cases were not suitable for class
certification at all. Consequently, some advocated that judges ought
to be able to defer class certification until individual case outcomes
indicated that a mass tort was ripe for certification. The "maturity
factor" would have permitted federal judges, in their discretion, to
assess the relative development of class litigation and whether the
litigation was evolved enough for certification.
The other proposed Rule 23(b) (3) amendment would have ad-
ded a famous "it just ain't worth it" factor. This proposal derived
not from the mass-tort-litigation experience but rather from the
consumer small-claims-class-action arena. The rationale under-
girding this proposal stemmed from the belief that judges-again
at their discretion-ought to be able to balance the costs and
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benefits of proposed class litigation and determine whether class
certification with the attendant costs was worth it.
Not surprisingly, both proposed new Rule 23(b) (3) factors gen-
erated a massive response. Attorneys involved in mass-tort litigation
aligned in predictable camps regarding the proposed maturity fac-
tor, with the plaintiffs' bar strongly opposed and the defense bar
just as strongly supportive. The colorfully labeled "itjust ain't worth
it" factor, which drew considerable support from judges, evoked the
particular ire of plaintiffs' attorneys and public-interest groups in-
volved in small-claims-consumer-class litigation. Rules Enabling Act
arguments raised their disagreeable heads regarding both propos-
als. Given the squishiness, subjectivity, and controversy entailed in
judicial evaluation of these factors, both proposals died aborning.
The history of the Rule 23 amendments also provides noteworthy
insight into the Advisory Committee's sensitivity to the concerns
raised by fellow jurists on the bench. Two examples from this pe-
riod illustrate how the Committee and its Reporter responded to
judicial quandaries encountered by those tasked with applying Rule
23.
The first illustration entails the controversy over settlement clas-
ses, which first surfaced in the Georgine global asbestos settlement
class in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1993-1994. In 1995,
Third Circuit Judge Edward R. Becker expressed (in an exhaustive
opinion) his considerable doubts about the legality of settlement
classes in an opinion reversing approval of a settlement class in
GMC Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation. Moreover,
he pointedly noted that he could not find authorization for settle-
ment classes in the text of Rule 23. Exacerbating this situation,
Judge Becker similarly reversed approval of the Georgine settlement
class the following year, in an opinion expressing considerable
hand wringing over the absence of a settlement-class provision in
Rule 23.
In immediate response to Judge Becker's GMC Pickup Truck and
Georgine opinions, the rather surprised Advisory Committee judges
collectively decided that if Judge Becker's problem was that he
could not find a settlement-class provision in Rule 23, then the Ad-
visory Committee would write one into the Rule. With this drafting
marching order, Professor Cooper crafted the famous Rule
23(b) (4) settlement-class provision. Needless to say, hardly any of
WINTER 20131
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the proposed Rule 23 amendments generated as great a firestorm
as the proposed Rule 23(b) (4) settlement class.
The proposed Rule 23(b) (4) amendment would have permitted
judges to certify and approve settlement classes, taking into account
the fact of the settlement. In essence, the proposed Rule 23(b) (4)
settlement class would have codified and indirectly sanctioned the
Georgine settlement class, which was then on its way to the Supreme
Court for final adjudication. Consequently, a wide array of attor-
neys, academics, interest groups, judges, and others aligned in vo-
ciferous support or opposition to the proposed Rule 23(b)(4)
provision, mimicking the positions arrayed in the Georgine litigation.
The proposed Rule 23(b) (4) settlement class also inspired the most
heated debate over whether the settlement-class provision trans-
gressed the Rules Enabling Act and embodied unconstitutional
rulemaking.
It also is noteworthy that during these early years of Professor
Cooper's tenure, consistent with the new era of Advisory Commit-
tee sunshine, the Committee for the first time began conducting its
very own traveling road shows throughout the United States to test-
drive the proposed Rule 23 amendments. Over the six-year span of
Rule 23 revision, the Committee and its Reporter were bombarded
with hundreds of written comments as well as verbal critiques deliv-
ered at town-hall meetings. Throughout this process, the patient
Professor Cooper prodigiously read hundreds of pages of com-
ments and listened to hours of rulemaking oratory.
The second illustration of Advisory Committee responsiveness to
judicial concerns occurred in late 1995, when Seventh CircuitJudge
Richard Posner issued his famous opinion in the HIV tainted-blood
products case, In re Rhone Poulenc. That decision reversed the certifi-
cation of a nationwide class of hemophiliacs who had unknowingly
used blood products infected with the HIV virus. Although that de-
cision had significant impact on the jurisprudence of mass-tort
class-certification issues, the much-less-noted first half of Judge Pos-
ner's opinion garnered the Advisory Committee's special attention.
The opening sections of Judge Posner's Rhone Poulenc decision
set forth a reasoned essay on the use of mandamus as a means for
conferring appellate jurisdiction to review class certification orders.
At the time of the Rhone Poulenc appeal, practically the only means
for judicial review of a class-certification order was pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). If a judge did not certify its order, however, a
losing party had no other appellate recourse than to seek manda-
mus review. In the heyday of mass-tort litigation, attorneys repeat-
edly used mandamus appeals to seek review of class-certification
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orders. In Rhone Poulenc, Judge Posner clearly indicated his disap-
proval of this practice while simultaneously looking askance and al-
lowing the mandamus appeal.
Following publication of Judge Posner's Rhone Poulenc opinion,
the Advisory Committee immediately discussed it and agreed to
amend Rule 23 to provide for a means for appellate review of class
certification orders. While proposals for such a provision previously
had been suggested, Judge Posner's Rhone Poulenc opinion clearly
provided the impetus for Committee action. Professor Cooper com-
posed the new Rule 23(f) provision. The Rhone Poulenc affair pro-
vides an instructive example of the very real synergy between the
Advisory Committee and current developments in the judicial
arena.
Perhaps the most memorable moment in the history of the Rule
23 amendments came very late in 1995 or 1996, when the Commit-
tee Chair, convening an Advisory Committee meeting, turned to
Professor Cooper and asked him to discuss his newest, umpteenth
draft of proposed Rule 23 amendments. Thinking for a few min-
utes, Professor Cooper-with Zen-like composure-quietly began
by saying, "I call this my minimalist draft."
Reviewing the history of his considerable labors from 1991 for-
ward, Professor Cooper went on to elucidate what the draft then
before the Committee did not contain. This new Rule 23 draft, he
explained, did not revise or amend anything in Rule 23(a). Rule
23(a) would remain intact as written. His Rule 23 draft did not re-
vise or amend anything in Rule 23(b), and the draft was shorn of
any new factors for Rule 23(b) (3). Gone were the maturity factor
and the "itjust ain't worth it" concept. And Rule 23 would not be
adding any new class-action categories: the controversial (b) (4) set-
tlement-class provision had been purged and consigned to the
dustbin of rulemaking history.
What, then, did the minimalist Rule 23 draft proposal contain?
What remained after nearly five years of the Rule 23 class actions
battles? Well, the minimalist draft modified Rule 23(c) to change
the language regarding timing of class certification from "as soon as
practical" to "at any early practicable time." Appreciation for this
amendment required the nuanced, linguistic parsing worthy of Jac-
ques Derrida or some other French deconstructionist. And there
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was the new Rule 23 (f) provision for appellate review of class certifi-
cation orders. Nonetheless, by 1996, after five years of work on re-
vising Rule 23, the 1996 class-action rule looked very much like the
1966 class-action rule.
** *
The denouement of the Rule 23 amendment saga suggests col-
lective exhaustion more than anything else. After years of heated
controversy, the fight had gone out of the partisan advocates. They
successfully had beat back almost all innovative revision of Rule 23,
and the language "at any early practicable time" hardly seemed
worth disputing. The same was true for the proposed Rule 23(f)
amendment. Although Rule 23(f) inspired some relatively muted
debate, almost everyone agreed that this was a timely and inspired
idea.
By the time of the 1996 presentation of Professor Cooper's mini-
malist draft, enthusiasm for further Rule 23 amendment was fairly
moribund. Judge Niemeyer had succeeded Judge Higginbotham as
Committee Chair, and Judge Niemeyer was more than happy to de-
flect further consideration of Rule 23 until the Supreme Court is-
sued its decisions on settlement classes in the Amchem and Ortiz
appeals. Under Judge Niemeyer's direction, Rule 23 revision was
removed to the Committee's back burner, to be superseded by the
electronic discovery wars.
The Rule 23(c) and (f) minimalist amendments were forwarded
to the Standing Committee and the Judicial Conference; the Su-
preme Court ultimately approved these amendments, which be-
came effective in 1997. The Advisory Committee resuscitated Rule
23 revision in the early 2000s-deliberations that ultimately re-
sulted in the unexciting and relatively noncontroversial addition of
Rule 23 (g) and (h) (relating to appointment of counsel and attor-
neys' fees).
The narrative of the Advisory Committee's Rule 23 revision and
Professor Cooper's efforts during the 1990s is instructive for several
reasons. First, this history illustrates the effects on Committee delib-
erations in the new era of public openness. For better or worse, the
narrative demonstrates how the Advisory Committee-in heeding
commentary from multiple, diverse sources-more often abandons
radical innovation in favor of consensus and non-controversial
change.
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The Advisory Committee's ancien rigime has most certainly not
been replaced by revolutionary forces. Instead, the Committee
often now spends years on rule revision that inevitably defaults to a
minimalist approach made famous by Professor Cooper. And the
Rule 23 narrative also illustrates the glacial pace at which rule revi-
sion is accomplished.
Second, the Rule 23 narrative allows us to appreciate the truly
inspiring temperament and craft of the Committee's Reporter over
the last twenty years, who has had to mediate the competing de-
mands and concerns of thousands of strong personalities. It is a
tribute to Professor Cooper's character that in the face of a barrage
of criticism (both constructive and destructive), he has maintained
his equanimity and good fellowship.
The American Law Institute counsels its newly appointed report-
ers to learn to "leave their ego outside the door." In observing Pro-
fessor Cooper over the past twenty years, one cannot help but
observe that he somehow has managed to leave his ego not outside
the door but off in some far-distant galaxy. Only a Zen reporter
could humbly characterize his draft proposal as an unadorned,
minimalist approach.
We are all much the better for his quiet presence and his modest
example.
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